In response to the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s and beyond, the Suharto (1966-1998) and Mahathir (1981-2003) governments undertook massive Islamisation programs in Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. This included co-opting influential religious scholars into state-sponsored institutions. In 1975, Suharto formed the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI); while in the 1980s, Mahathir upgraded the Malaysian National Fatwa Council (JKF-MKI), JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) and IKIM (Malaysian Institute for Islamic Understanding). The 'official' ulamas-the religious scholars who participated in these institutions-were expected to support the states' ideologies in exchange for reward and recognition. This book examines the extent to which official ulamas in contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia capitalised on their co-optation to 'capture' the states. By capture, a concept popularized in political economy, I refer to societal actors' ability to influence laws, policies, and the distribution of resources in their favour. The book examines how policies undertaken by Suharto (1966-1998) and Mahathir (1981-2003) determine capture successes and failures of official ulama in their respective countries.